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Abstract
We give an overview of the diverse electoral systems used in local, national,
or super-national elections around the world. We discuss existing methods for
selecting single and multiple winners and give real-world examples for some
more elaborate systems. Eventually, we elaborate on some of the better known
strengths and weaknesses of various methods from both the theoretical and
practical points of view.
1 Introduction
An electoral system, or simply a voting method, defines the rules by which the choices
or preferences of voters are collected, tallied, aggregated, and collectively interpreted
to obtain the results of an election [49, 73].
There are many electoral systems. A voter may be allowed to vote for one or
multiple candidates, one or multiple predefined lists of candidates, or state their
preference among candidates or predefined lists of candidates. Accordingly, tallying
may involve a simple count of the number of votes for each candidate or list, or a
relatively more complex procedure of multiple rounds of counting and transferring
ballots between candidates or lists. Eventually, the outcome of the tallying and
aggregation procedures is interpreted to determine which candidate wins which seat.
Designing end-to-end verifiable e-voting schemes is challenging. Indeed, most
such schemes are initially designed to support relatively unsophisticated voting
methods in which ballot structure and tallying rules are straightforward. How-
ever, extending such a scheme to support more complex voting methods may not be
trivial. Issues such as efficiently encoding preferential ballots with a large number of
candidates and preserving voter privacy when transferring ballots during multiple
rounds of counting can introduce considerable design challenges. Such challenges
are evidenced for instance by the compromises made in the design of the state-of-
the-art vVote system used for recent Victorian elections [37]. There have been a
few works attempting to address these challenges (see, e.g., [85] and the references
within), nevertheless achieving practical end-to-end verifiable schemes supporting
complex voting methods remains an area of research with many open questions.
A good understanding of how different voting methods work is a prerequisite for
tackling such open questions. In this chapter we aim to provide an introduction to
the diverse voting methods used around the world.
Mathematically, an electoral system can be seen as a function that takes as
input the choices or preferences of the voters and produces as output the results
∗This is a personally archived version of a chapter by the same title [80] contributed to the
book “Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment”, Feng Hao and Peter Y.
A. Ryan (editors), Series in Security, Privacy and Trust, CRC Press, 2016.
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of the election. Voting theory, and more broadly social choice theory, provides a
formal framework for the study of different electoral systems, and in general social
choice functions. A social choice function in this framework is a function that takes
as input a set of individual orderings of a set of alternatives and produces a social
ordering of the alternatives. This formalization was first put forth by Arrow [27], a
pioneer of modern voting theory.
In practice however, there is much more to an election than just the electoral
system, and these other issues are equally (if not more) important as the choice
of the electoral system in ensuring fair and free elections and establishing public
trust. Among these issues are (pre-election) voter registration, observer missions
during the election, and post-election audits. From a legal point of view, the elec-
toral system is only one part of the much wider electoral laws and regulations which
govern the rules and procedures involved in calling, running, and finalizing an elec-
tion from the start to the end. These rules and procedures include those of voter
eligibility, candidate nomination, party campaigning, election administration, and
announcement of results. In this chapter however, we mainly focus on electoral
systems.
Electoral systems can be categorized in multiple different ways. Two common
criteria for categorization are whether the system is designed to produce one winner
or multiple winners, and whether the system is designed to produce results that
are roughly proportional to the vote share of each party or the system is based
on the “winner takes all” approach. In the remainder of this chapter however we
have chosen not to be bound to such categorizations. Instead, we follow the ideas
underlying different electoral systems and work our way from the more immediate
design ideas to the more elaborate ones.
2 Some Solutions to Electing A Single Winner
Perhaps the most natural solution to elect a single winner is to elect the candi-
date with the most votes. This idea is the basis of the so-called first-past-the-post
electoral system.
In a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, each voter can vote for one candi-
date and the single candidate with the highest number of votes wins. The winner
might achieve an absolute majority of votes (i.e., more than a half), or merely a
plurality of votes (i.e., most votes relatively). The system is also known as single-
member plurality (SMP) or simple plurality. In the case of a race with only
two candidates such a system is also called a simple majority system.
First-past-the-post is used, among other places, in USA presidential elections (48
states) [32], UK lower house elections [64], Canada [60], India [54], and Malaysia [52].
There are variants of the first-past-the-post system that require the winning
candidate to achieve a quota, i.e., a threshold of votes, which is higher than the
natural quota. For instance, in a two-candidate election, the winning candidate
might be required to receive a quota which is greater than half of the votes: in
the United States upper house, a so-called filibuster preventing legislation may be
stopped only if the legislation receives three-fifth of the votes [46]. These systems
are sometimes called quota systems, and in the case of a two-candidate election a
super-majority system.
Note that in the first-past-the-post system, each voter is restricted to vote for
only one candidate. If this restriction is lifted, the resulting system is called approval
voting.
In an approval voting system, each voter may vote for (i.e., approve of) any
number of candidates and the single candidate with the highest number of votes
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(i.e., approvals) wins.
Approval voting is used among other places by the Mathematical Association
of America [20], the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sci-
ences [19], and the American Statistical Association [18].
Although first-past-the-post provides a simple solution to elect a single winner,
it does not guarantee an absolute majority if there are more than two candidates.
One way to make sure that the winner receives an absolute majority is to choose
the two candidates with the most votes for a second round of voting.
In a two-round system (TRS), each voter votes for one candidate. If a candi-
date receives more than half of the votes, they are declared the winner. Otherwise,
the two candidates with the highest number of votes are chosen as the only candi-
dates for a second round of voting, and the rest of the candidates are eliminated.
In the second round, each voter can vote for one of the two remaining candidates,
and the candidate with the highest number of votes wins. The system is sometimes
abbreviated as 2RS and is also known as run-off voting and double-ballot.
The two-round system is used in many countries to elect members of the parlia-
ment and directly-elected presidents, e.g., in both presidential elections and lower
house elections in France [42].
There are other variations of TRS in which all candidates receiving a certain
quota become eligible for the second round, or a candidate can be declared a winner
in the first round if they meet certain conditions, e.g., achieve a certain quota and
have a certain lead over the second candidate.
To avoid the cost of a second round of voting, an idea is to ask voters for their
preferences between the candidates on the ballot.
In the contingent vote system, voters rank the candidates in order of prefer-
ence. The ballots are then distributed between the candidates based on their first
preference votes. If a candidate receives more than half of the ballots (i.e., the first
preference votes), they are declared the winner. Otherwise, the two candidates with
the highest number of first preference votes are chosen as the only candidates for
a second round of counting, and the rest of the candidates are eliminated. In the
second round of counting, the ballots stating an eliminated candidate as the first
preference are re-distributed (or transferred) to one of the two remaining candidates
based on which candidate is ranked above the other. Eventually, the candidate with
the highest number of votes is declared the winner.
A variant of the contingent vote where the voters are restricted to express only
their top two preferences is used to elect the directly elected mayors in England,
including the Mayor of London [23]. Another variant where the voters are restricted
to express only their top three preferences is used in the Sri Lankan presidential
elections [70, p. 135]. Note that these variants do not guarantee an absolute majority
for the winner.
An alternative to ensure an absolute majority for the winner is to carry out
multiple rounds of voting and in each round only eliminate the candidate with the
lowest number of votes.
In the exhaustive ballot system, the voter may vote for one candidate of their
choice in each round of voting. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of
the votes, they are declared the winner. Otherwise, the candidate with the lowest
number of votes is eliminated and the next round of voting is carried out between
the remaining candidates. These steps are repeated until a candidate receives an
absolute majority.
The exhaustive ballot system is used among other places to elect the members
of the Swiss Federal Council [9], the President of the European Parliament [1], the
speakers of the Canadian House of Commons [8], the British House of Commons [11],
and the Scottish Parliament [7], the host city of the Olympic Games, and the host
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Table 1: An example of instant run-off voting (IRV): The 2014 mayoral election
results in Derwent Valley council, Tasmania, Australia
Candidates
PBe PBi MEv CLe FPe Exhausted Majority Remark
870 333 1632 423 620 0 1940 Count 1
+73 -333 +86 +60 +62 +52 PBi excluded
943 0 1718 483 682 52 1914 Count 2
+154 +147 -483 +135 +47 CLe excluded
1097 1865 0 817 99 1890 Count 3
+386 +307 -817 +124 FPe excluded
1483 2172 0 223 1828 Count 4
MEv elected
of the FIFA World Cup.
To avoid multiple rounds of voting, the voters can be asked to state their pref-
erences on the ballots. This is the basis for the following system.
In the instant run-off voting (IRV) system, the voters rank the candidates
in order of preference. The ballots are then distributed between the candidates
based on their first preference votes. If a candidate receives more than half of the
ballots (i.e., the first preference votes), they are declared the winner. Otherwise,
the candidate with the lowest number of allocated ballots is eliminated and their
allocated ballots are redistributed (or transferred) to the next ranked candidate on
each ballot who is not yet eliminated. These steps are repeated until a candidate
is allocated an absolute majority of the ballots and is declared the winner. The
system is also known as the alternative vote (AV).
The instant run-off electoral system is used among other places in the Australian
lower house elections [43], and the Irish presidential elections [13].
Partial ranking of the candidates might be allowed. In this case, all the candi-
dates ranked on a ballot might get eliminated before the final round. Such ballots are
called exhausted ballots. The system guarantees an absolute majority only among
the ballots that are neither spoiled nor exhausted by the last round of counting. On
the other hand, voters might be asked to submit a full ranking of all the candidates
on the ballot so as to minimize exhausted and hence “wasted” ballots. However, in
practice this usually leads to an increase in the number of invalid votes.
As an example of IRV, consider the results shown in Table 1 for the election
of mayor in Derwent Valley council from the 2014 Tasmanian local government
elections [6]. There were a total of 3878 valid ballots, which means the initial quota
for absolute majority was ⌊3878/2⌋+1 = 1940, where ⌊·⌋ denote the floor function.
The first five columns show the progressive total ballots for the five candidates. As
seen in the table, in the first count no candidate achieves absolute majority, and
hence the candidate with the lowest number of votes, PBi, is eliminated. PBi’s 333
ballots are examined and transferred to their respective second preferences: in this
case, 73 to PBe, 86 to MEv, 60 to CLe, and 62 to FPe. Fifty two ballots do not have
a second preference stated, and hence are exhausted. This means that in the next
round the quota for absolute majority is reduced to 1914. No candidate achieves
majority in the second and third rounds of voting and further two candidates are
eliminated and their ballots transferred. In the final round, MEv has 2172 ballots
which is above the absolute majority quota of 1828 and hence MEv is elected.
The IRV method discussed above is the single-winner version of an electoral
system known as the single transferable vote (STV) which we will discuss later in
this chapter. These methods were proposed by Thomas Hare [53], and hence are
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sometimes collectively known simply as the Hare system.
While Hare’s method eliminates the candidate with the lowest first-preference
votes in each round, a variant called Coombs’ method [34] eliminates the candi-
date with the highest last-preference votes in each round. In other words, in each
round Hare excludes the least liked candidate, whereas Coombs excludes the most
disliked candidate.
3 Some Solutions to Electing Multiple Winners
To elect multiple winners, one could of course simply extend the first-past-the-post
system and elect multiple candidates with the highest number of votes. Let us
assume the desired number of winners (or seats) is n.
In a block-vote (BV) system, a voter votes for up to n candidates. The
candidates are then ordered based on the number of votes they have received and
the first n candidates are declared winners. The system is also known as plurality-
at-large voting and multiple non-transferable vote (MNTV).
The system is used among other places in elections in Lebanon [76].
The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system can be seen as a block-
vote system in which the voters are restricted to vote for only one candidate. This
system is used among other places in the Japanese upper house elections [36].
A block-vote system in which the voters can vote for more than one but fewer
than n candidates is known as limited vote (LV). The Spanish upper house elec-
tions use this system, in which the voters may vote for up to three candidates
whereas four winners are elected [57].
Another variant of the block-vote, sometimes called the party block-vote
(PBV), requires voters to vote for a party (or in general a predetermined list
of candidates) instead of voting directly for candidates. After the count, the party
with the highest number of votes is allocated all the n seats. This variant can be
thought of a first-past-the-post election between parties. It is used among other
places in Cameroon [70, Annex A] and Singapore [70, Annex A].
The party block-vote system, like many other systems based on the “winner
takes all” paradigm, may produce results that are significantly skewed towards one
or more popular parties. The underlying idea of the so-called proportional rep-
resentation (PR) electoral systems is to ensure that the number of elected can-
didates from each party (or coalition of parties) is to some extent proportional to
their respective share of the votes.
In the list voting or more specifically party-list PR system, each party
presents a list of candidates and seats are allocated to each party in proportion
to the number of votes the party receives.
In what is known as the closed-list variant, the voters vote for a list, and
after the number of seats allocated to each party is determined, that number of
candidates on top of the party list are elected. Hence, the order in which candidates
get elected from each list is pre-determined merely by the party and the voters do
not get to choose it. The closed-list system is used among other places in national
parliamentary elections in Argentina [70, Annex A], Portugal [35], Spain [57], and
South Africa [51]. The system is also used in the European parliament elections in
many countries including Germany, France, United Kingdom (excluding Northern
Ireland), and Spain [82, Part 5].
On the other hand, in the open-list variant, the voters vote for candidates, and
the number of votes each candidate receives influences the order in which candi-
dates are chosen from a party list at the end of the election. Since voter preferences
can influence the order of the elected candidates, such systems are also known as
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Table 2: An example of the d’Hondt method of proportional representation voting:
2011 election results in the Częstochowa constituency, Poland
Party vote vote/2 vote/3 vote/4 seats
PO 34.97 17.49 11.66 8.74 3
PiS 27.36 13.68 9.12 6.84 2
RP 13.39 6.70 4.46 3.35 1
SLD 10.49 5.25 3.50 2.62 1
PSL 8.77 4.39 2.92 2.19 0
PJN 2.14 1.07 0.71 0.54 0
NP 2.06 1.03 0.69 0.52 0
PPP 0.84 0.42 0.28 0.21 0
preferential list voting. There are multiple different deployments of this variant
which give the voter varying amounts of influence. Hence, some scholars suggest
using the term “open list” exclusively for the systems in which the order of elected
candidates is solely determined by voter preferences, and refer to the systems in
which the order of elected candidates is determined by a combination of party list
orders and voter preferences as flexible list voting (see, e.g., [81, 49]). Open-list
voting is used widely around the world including in the Brazilian [66], Dutch [25],
Czech [58], and Swedish [77] lower house elections. The system is also used in the
European parliament elections in many countries including Italy, Poland, and the
Netherlands [82, Part 5]. The open-list systems used in Luxembourg and Switzer-
land parliamentary elections are unique in that they allow for panachage, i.e., voters
are allowed to split their preferences between multiple parties [83, 59].
A two-round variant of the closed-list system is in use in French regional elec-
tions [59]. Any party with at least a predetermined threshold of the votes may
contest the second round. In the second round, the seats are allocated to the par-
ties proportionally to their shares of the votes.
There are various methods for seat allocation based on each party’s share of the
votes. The two most common categories are the highest average and the largest
remainder methods.
In the highest-average (HA) methods, the number of votes for each party
is successively divided by a set of divisors, resulting in a series of quotients called
averages. Eventually, n of the top values among the averages of all parties are
determined and the number of averages selected for each party gives their share of
the final n seats.
One of the most widely used highest-average methods is the d’Hondt method
in which the divisors are (1, 2, 3, 4, . . .). The method is used among many other
places in the Polish lower house elections [65]. Table 2 shows the results for the
lower house constituency of Częstochowa in the 2011 Polish parliamentary elections
according to the Polish national electoral commission [17]. The constituency has
seven seats. The first two columns show the parties with their (rounded) percentage
of valid votes. The third, fourth, and fifth columns show the votes for each party
divided by the divisors 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The seven highest averages in the
table, shown underlined, determine the number of seats allocated to each party. For
instance, since the PiS party has 2 of the highest 7 averages, it wins 2 of the 7 seats.
The idea here is that any change in the allocated number of seats would put a party
in disadvantage in terms of average number of votes per seat. For example, PO’s 3
seats means they have a seat on average for every 11.66% of votes, whereas if PO’s
third seat were allocated to PSL instead, it would mean that PSL would get a seat
on average for every 8.77% of the votes.
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Table 3: An example of the largest remainder method of proportional representation
using the Droop quota: 2011 Gauteng Provincial Legislature election results, South
Africa
Party votes quotient initial remainder extra total
seats seats seats
ANC 2,348,564 39.66 39 0.66 1 40
DA 1,349,001 22.78 22 0.78 1 23
EFF 451,318 7.62 7 0.62 1 8
VF+ 52,436 0.89 0 0.89 1 1
IFP 34,240 0.58 0 0.58 1 1
ACDP 27,196 0.46 0 0.46 0 0
COPE 21,652 0.37 0 0.37 0 0
NFP 20,733 0.35 0 0.35 0 0
The Sainte-Laguë method is similar to the d’Hondt method, but uses the
divisors (1, 3, 5, 7, . . .) instead. Other highest average methods also follow the same
principle, but utilize different divisors. Among these are the modified Sainte-
Laguë method with divisors (1.4, 3, 5, 7, . . .), the Imperiali method with divisors
(2, 3, 4, 5, . . .), and the Danish method with divisors (1, 4, 7, 10, . . .).
In the largest remainder (LR) methods, first a quota is calculated, represent-
ing the number of votes required for a seat. Then the number of votes for each
party is divided by the quota to obtain a quotient consisting of an integer and a
fractional part. The fractional part is called a remainder. Each party is allocated a
number of initial seats equal to the integer part of their quotient. This will amount
to a total of ni initial seats. The remaining n−ni seats are distributed between the
n − ni parties with the largest remainders, giving each such party an extra seat.
The Hare quota and the Droop quota are two widely used quotas in LR sys-
tems. The Hare quota is calculated by dividing the total number of (valid) votes to
the number of seats. The Droop quota is calculated by dividing the total number
of (valid) votes to the number of seats plus one, and then adding 1 to the result.
Fractions are usually disregarded in calculating quotas. In other words, we have:
Hare quota =
⌊
no. of votes
no. of seats
⌋
and Droop quota = 1 +
⌊
no. of votes
1 + no. of seats
⌋
.
Other quotas that are used include the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota which is one
less than the Droop quota, and the Imperiali quota which is calculated by dividing
the number of votes into the number of seats plus two.
The Droop quota is used in the national and provincial elections in South
Africa [51]. Table 3 shows the Gauteng Provincial Legislature results in the 2014
South African National and Provincial Elections [12]. The table only shows the first
eight parties. The first two columns show the parties and their respective number
of votes. There are 73 seats to be allocated. The total number of valid votes is
4,382,163. The Droop quota hence is calculated as ⌊4, 382, 163/(73 + 1)⌋ + 1 =
59, 219. Dividing the votes for each party by the quota gives the quotient, the
number of initial seats (the integer part of the quotient), and the remainder (the
fractional part of the quotient). The total number of initial seats is 68 which leaves
5 extra seats to be allocated to the 5 parties with the largest remainders, shown
underlined in the table.
The South African system is an example of a PR system without a threshold.
However, most PR systems require a threshold to be achieved for the party to be
eligible for any seats. The lower the threshold is, the more proportional the results
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will be.
Some argue that in many of the systems discussed so far, especially if the num-
ber of seats is relatively low, there is a potential for many votes to be so-called
“wasted”. For example, in Table 2, votes for the last four parties, although counting
for more than 10% of the votes, do not count toward electing any candidate and
are arguably wasted. The single transferable vote (STV) system, which can be seen
as a generalization of the instant run-off (IRV) to elect multiple winners aims to
minimize votes being wasted by asking voters to declare their preferences. This way,
if a preferred candidate does not receive enough support to be elected, the vote is
transferred to the next preferred candidate and finally counts towards electing one
of the candidates on the voter’s list. STV was first proposed in the 1850s by Thomas
Hare [53].
In the single transferable vote (STV) system, the voters indicate their pref-
erences between the candidates by ranking them on the ballot. In each round of
counting if a candidate achieves a certain quota, he or she is elected. Otherwise, the
candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated from the race. Then either
the elected candidate’s surplus votes or all of the eliminated candidate’s votes are
transferred to the next candidate appearing on the preference list who is neither
already elected nor already eliminated. The process continues until either all seats
are allocated or the number of candidates remaining in the race is reduced to the
number of remaining available seats.
STV is used in parliamentary elections in Ireland [48] and the upper house
elections in Australia at the national level [43], and in the Scottish local council
elections [29] and Tasmanian lower house elections [45] at the subnational level.
The system is also used in the European parliament elections in Ireland, Northern
Ireland, and Malta [82, Part 5].
The quota normally used with STV is the Droop quota. Transferring ballots for
the eliminated candidates is similar to that of IRV. However, in case a candidate
achieves higher votes than the quota, their ballots above the quota are called a
surplus and may be transferred. One may think of this process as transferring
a portion of the elected candidate’s ballots that are not needed for them to be
elected. Hence, all the transferable ballots are examined, and the share of each next
preference from the surplus votes is determined. This usually results in fractional
ballot transfers between the candidates. The rules governing when and how exactly
the surplus transfers should be carried out are different between elections in different
countries.
Determining STV election winners can be complex and often consists of tens
of rounds of counting. Here however we consider a less complex example. Table 4
shows the results of the 2009 Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania elections in the
South Region [21]. The total number of votes is 71, and two candidates are to be
chosen. Hence, the initial Droop quota is ⌊71/3⌋+ 1 = 24. As the table shows, in
the first round, candidate S’s first preference votes are more than enough to get him
or her elected. Thus, S is declared elected in the first round. However, since S only
needs 24 votes to get elected, S’s surplus votes, 9 votes in this case, are transferred
to his or her corresponding second preferences. To do this fairly, all the 33 votes are
examined. In this case, 6 of S’s ballots list K as the second preference, 15 list M,
and 12 list N. That is, 6/33 of any transferring ballot should go to K, 15/33 to M,
and 12/33 to N. Now that 9 ballots are transferring, 9(6/33) ≈ 1.63 ballots go to K,
9(15/33) ≈ 4.09 to M, and 9(12/33) ≈ 3.27 to N. The totals in the second round do
not push any candidate above the quota, hence the candidate with the least votes,
K, is eliminated and K’s 7 votes are distributed, in this case, 4 to M and 3 to N.
This gives N enough votes to be declared the second winner.
The above example was a rather straightforward case of determining STV win-
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Table 4: An example of single transferable vote (STV) using the Droop quota: 2009
Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania (South) election results, Australia
Candidates
K M N S Exhausted Quota Remark
7 13 18 33 0 24 Count 1
+1.63 +4.09 +3.27 -9 S elected
8.63 17.09 21.27 24 0 24 Count 2
-7 +4 +3 K excluded
1.63 21.09 24.27 24 0 24 Count 3
N elected
ners. However, note that in many cases for instance if there are multiple winners in
any round, or if there are exhausted ballots and hence the quota changes, there could
be different methods for how and when to transfer votes. Although the difference
between such different methods might seem insignificant, they may lead to different
outcomes in the election. The transfer rules are usually agreed on and published in
detail before the election, and as mentioned before, they vary considerably between
different jurisdictions.
4 Blending Systems Together
Elections with single-member districts are praised for clearly tying a representative
to a constituency and hence fostering a higher degree of accountability for elected
representatives. On the other hand, elections with multi-member districts using
proportional representation (PR) systems such as party-list are designed to produce
results in which the number of seats each party wins is to a great extent proportional
to the party’s share of popular vote. To combine the positive aspects of these two
types of systems, many jurisdictions run two systems alongside each other.
In a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, one voting method is
used for electing individual representatives for each constituency, and besides this
first method, a second PR method is used to compensate for any disproportionality
produced by the constituency results. In some MMP systems, the voter is able to
vote in each method separately. In other systems however, the voter votes for the
constituency representative only, and the party vote is calculated by aggregating
the candidate votes in all of the constituencies in a larger PR district. There may
be a single national PR district or several subnational ones.
The MMP system is used among other places in parliamentary elections in Ger-
many [75], Hungary [30], Mexico [39], and New Zealand [84], which use combinations
of first-past-the-post and list-PR.
In a two-tier system, two parallel and independent methods are used: one voting
method is used for electing individual representatives for each constituency, and a
PR method is used to elect members proportional to party vote shares independently
of how many seats the parties win at constituency level. The PR method districts
are larger than the constituencies, usually several subnational districts or a single
national district. Two-tier systems are also known simply as parallel systems.
The two-tier system is used in parliamentary elections among other places in
South Korea [72], Japan [69], and Thailand [55], which use first-past-the-post along-
side list-PR, and in Lithuania [65], which uses the two-round system alongside list-
PR.
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5 Other Solutions
In this section, we review some of the other systems that are less widely used in
national and subnational elections.
In the Borda count, each voter ranks the candidates on the ballot. The can-
didates each get a number of points based on their rank, according to a point
allocation scheme which is decreasing with respect to rank. For instance, if there
are k candidates on the ballot, the i-th ranked candidate is allocated k − i points,
i.e., k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0 points respectively for candidates in the order of preference.
The points each candidate receives in all ballots are summed up and the candidate
with the highest sum of points is declared the winner.
This system is used in a few political elections around the world including
Nauru [71] and Kiribati [71], and other places such as the Eurovision Song Con-
test [24]. In Slovenia, the Borda count, which is used to elect the representatives
for the Hungarian and Italian-speaking ethnic minorities, allocates k + 1− i points
to the i-th ranked candidate, i.e., k, k − 1, . . . , 1 points respectively for candidates
in the order of preference. In parliamentary elections in Nauru, the i-th ranked
candidate is allocated 1/i points, i.e., 1, 1
2
, . . . , 1
k
points, respectively, for candidates
in the order of preference.
In the cumulative voting system, each voter has a fixed number of points
to share between a number of candidates, and the single or multiple candidates
receiving the highest total points are declared winners.
Cumulative voting is used among other places in Norfolk Island Legislative As-
sembly elections where each voter gets nine votes to share between the candidates
with the restriction that no more than two votes can be given to any single candi-
date [28]. Besides, the system is used in some local elections in the United States
(see, e.g., [2, 4]), and also in board elections in corporate governance (see, e.g., [33,
p. 270]), where typically each shareholder is given a number of votes proportional
to their share.
In a range voting system, the voter rates the candidates on the ballot, i.e.,
gives each a score, and the candidate with the highest sum of scores is declared the
winner. Approval voting can be seen as an instance of range voting in which only
binary scores, i.e., approve or disapprove, are allowed. A variant called majority
judgement calculates the winner based on the median score for each candidate.
Range voting is used in scoring some sports competitions such as figure skat-
ing [15] and gymnastics [10] where a truncated mean of the scores from multiple
judges determines the final results. It is also used in web-based scoring and recom-
mendation systems such as the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) where a weighted
mean of the individual scores determines the final scores [14].
In Condorcet methods, the voter usually ranks the candidates, and Condorcet
winner is the candidate, if any, which is pair-wise preferred to all other candidates
by the majority of voters. The Condorcet winner is not guaranteed to exist. Any
method that elects the Condorcet winner, if any, is generally known as a Condorcet
method. A Condorcet method for n candidates can be thought of as running 1
2
n(n−
1) simple majority elections between all possible pairs of candidates, and finding
if there is a candidate that beats all others in their corresponding head-to-head
election.
There are various methods to calculate the Condorcet winner if any, and other-
wise produce a plausible replacement winner. For instance, in the method known as
Smith/IRV, the counting produces a so-called Smith set, defined as the smallest
non-empty set of candidates such that every candidate in the set defeats every can-
didate outside the set in a pair-wise election. The Condorcet winner is guaranteed
to be in the Smith set. Hence, if the Smith set includes only one candidate, that
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candidate is declared the Condorcet winner. If the Condorcet winner does not exist,
then the IRV method is used to elect a winner between the candidates in the Smith
set.
In the system known as Black’s method if the Condorcet winner exists, they
are declared the winner, and otherwise the Borda count is used to calculate the
winner.
Another Condorcet method known as the Schulze method [79] involves finding
preference paths between candidates and comparing them based on the so-called
“strength” of the paths. The method outputs a complete ordering of the candidate
and hence can be used to elect multiple candidates.
Condorcet methods, and specifically the Schulze method, are fairly popular
within the free software and free culture communities, and for instance are used in
the internal elections of the several national Pirate Parties [74, p. 213], the Debian
project [5], Ubuntu [22], KDE [16], and the Free Software Foundation Europe [3].
6 Which Systems Are Good?
Every one of us might have already had a favourite electoral system before reading
this chapter, or might have set our mind on one while reading the chapter. We
might think that our favourite system is obviously superior to the others we know
of and have our reasons supporting our argument. However, social choice theorists
on the one hand and electoral assistance experts on the other hand would be able
to provide a variety of counter arguments pointing towards the weaknesses of our
favourite system compared to other systems. In this section we aim to go through
some of the better known comparative strengths and weaknesses of the electoral
systems we have discussed, from both the theoretical and practical points of view.
6.1 A Theorist’s Point of View
Social choice theory provides a variety of results on the merits of different electoral
systems. Some of these results are naturally expected, while some utterly unex-
pected. Nonetheless, the results are interesting on both sides, either providing a
solid theoretical foundation to build upon in the former case, or challenging our
common understanding of such systems and compelling us to rethink and design
better systems in the latter case.
6.1.1 Majority Rules
Let us first limit our attention to elections with only two candidates. Perhaps one of
the expected, and yet illuminating early results in this case is May’s theorem, which
pretty much settles the question of which system is the best choice in elections with
two candidates. To define a notion of a good system, let us start by defining the
following criteria:
• a system is called egalitarian1 if it treats all voters equally;
• a system is called neutral (with respect to candidates) if it treats all candidates
equally;
• a system is called monotone if the candidate who wins an election would still
win if one or more voters change their vote in favour of the winning candidate
1This criterion is often called anonymity in modern social choice theory. We use May’s original
term to avoid confusion with anonymity from the security viewpoint.
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and everyone else votes the same way; in other words, it is impossible for a
winning candidate to become a losing candidate by gaining votes; and
• a system is called nearly decisive if the only way a tie can occur is when the
two candidates receive exactly the same number of votes.
The above criteria seem quite natural to expect from a good electoral system. In
fact, May has shown that the simple majority system is the only system that can
satisfy all four criteria [62].
Theorem 1 (May’s theorem) In an election with two candidates, the only elec-
toral system that is egalitarian, neutral, monotone, and nearly decisive is the simple
majority method.
May’s theorem is definitive in that the simple majority system is the only sys-
tem that could satisfy the above reasonable requirements. In fact, even if we do
not care about the electoral system being decisive, an extension of May’s theorem
states that the only two-candidate electoral systems that are egalitarian, neutral,
and monotone are the following ones: simple majority, super-majority, and a third
nonsensical system which results in a tie regardless of the number of votes for the
two candidates [73, p. 20]. On the other hand, if we define a (strictly) decisive
system to be one that always produces a winner (i.e., never ends in a tie), then it
is not hard to see that the three properties of equality, neutrality, and decisiveness
are inherently contradictory; that is, there is no electoral system for two candidates
that is egalitarian, neutral, and decisive. This statement is true even when elections
with more than two candidates are considered. This leads us to believe that (strict)
decisiveness might be too strong a requirement to expect from an electoral system.
6.1.2 Bad News Begins
Now consider elections with more than two candidates and a single winner. Equality
and neutrality can still be defined similarly. Equality can be formalized by requiring
that the outcome of the election stays the same if any two voters exchange their
ballots. Similarly, neutrality can be formalized by requiring that if candidate A is
replaced with candidate B on all ballots, and vice versa, i.e., candidate B is also
replaced with candidate A on all ballots, then the same replacements are replicated
in the outcome of the election.
Formalizing monotonicity in the case of more than two candidates needs to be
elaborated on to define a precise sense of the voters changing their votes in favour
of the winning candidate. In the case of only two candidates, it is clear that this
means changing a vote for the losing candidate to a vote for the winning candidate.
For an election with more than two candidates, let us consider the rather general
case where voters rank the candidates on the ballots. We can now specify what is
meant by changing a vote in favour of the winning candidate as changing the rank
of the winning candidate on a ballot with the rank of a losing candidate which is
ranked higher than the winning candidate, and vice versa.
Let us now define more criteria to assess our electoral system against. All of
these are criteria that we would naturally want a good system to satisfy.
• a system satisfies the majority criterion if whenever a candidate receives a
majority of the first preferences, the system elects B as the winner;
• a system satisfies the Condorcet criterion if it elects the Condorcet winner
whenever such a winner exists;
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• a system satisfies the Pareto criterion (also called unanimity) if whenever
every voter prefers candidate A to candidate B, the system does not elect B
as the winner; and
• a system satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion
if the following holds: consider an election in which A is elected the winner,
and a second election in which all voters rank A above or below B the same
way they have done in the first election, but may change their preferences of
other candidates; the system must not choose B as the winner in the second
election; in other words, IIA requires that the electoral system’s preference
between any two candidates depends only on the individual voters’ preferences
between those two candidates.
Note that if a candidate receives a majority of first preferences, the candidate beats
all other candidates in head-to-head contests, and hence is the Condorcet winner.
Thus, the Condorcet criterion is a stronger criterion than the majority criterion,
i.e., the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion. In fact, the Condorcet
and IIA criteria are incompatible as stated by the following theorem [73, p. 55].
Theorem 2 There is no electoral system for an election with more than two candi-
dates that satisfies both the Condorcet and the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) criteria.
The above theorem is one of several impossibility results in social choice theory.
Each of these results shows the impossibility of electoral systems satisfying a set of
criteria simultaneously. Such results can be seen as a contributing reason why the
debate over the merits of different electoral systems is far from settled. A funda-
mental issue with distilling a social preference from a set of individual preferences
which eventually is responsible for many such results is the following observation.
The Condorcet paradox is the observation that majority preferences can be
“irrational” (specifically, intransitive), even when individual preferences are “ratio-
nal” (specifically, transitive).
To see an example of this paradox, consider an election with three candidates A,
B, and C. Assume we have three voters whose preferences are as follows. The first
voter prefers A to B, and B to C, and since we are assuming rational voters, also A
to C; or in shorthand A ≻ B ≻ C. The second voter’s preferences are B ≻ C ≻ A,
and the third voter’s C ≻ A ≻ B. Now the majority of voters prefer A to B, B to
C, and C to A. This means that although the individual preferences are transitive,
the majority preference is intransitive.
6.1.3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
A well-known impossibility result which has been described as “the single most im-
portant result in the history of voting theory” [56] is Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Arrow considers electoral systems that provide a full ranking of the candidates as
outcome. He defines the following criteria in addition to the ones we have discussed
so far:
• a system satisfies the unrestricted domain criterion (or universality, the term
originally used by Arrow) if it does not place any restriction other than tran-
sitivity on how voters can rank the candidates;
• a system satisfies the non-imposition criterion (or citizen sovereignty, the term
originally used by Arrow) if its outcome is not restricted (i.e., not imposed) in
any way other than being transitive; in other words, every transitive outcome
is possible in the election depending on individual orderings; and
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• a system satisfies the non-dictatorship criterion if there is no single voter (i.e.,
a dictator) whose vote determines the outcome of the election regardless of
how others vote.
Note that non-dictatorship is a weaker criterion than equality, i.e., equality implies
non-dictatorship.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem basically says that the only unrestricted-domain
electoral systems which are monotone and independent of irrelevant alternatives are
either imposed or dictatorial [26].
Theorem 3 (Arrow’s impossibility theorem) There is no electoral system for
an election with more than two candidates that satisfies the unrestricted domain,
monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criteria and is nei-
ther imposed nor dictatorial.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is pretty strong in ruling out the possibility of
existence of any fair electoral system that satisfies three reasonable criteria that
one may expect from a good system. It can be even stated in a stronger form
since monotonicity, IIA, and non-imposition together imply the Pareto criterion. In
its stronger form, the theorem basically says unrestricted domain, Pareto, and IIA
properties are incompatible [56].
Theorem 4 (Arrow’s impossibility theorem (strong form)) There is no elec-
toral system for an election with more than two candidates that satisfies the unre-
stricted domain, Pareto, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criteria
and is not dictatorial.
Although Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that certain desirable criteria are
incompatible with each other, what it does not say is that there are no reasonable
systems around. The question of choosing the right system hence becomes that of
the choices we make between the desirable criteria to achieve a compromise.
One possible compromise would be to consider systems in which the voter’s
ranking of candidates is restricted in some way, and hence the system does not
support an unrestricted domain. Of course this should be done in a way that
neutrality is still kept intact. An example of such a system is the approval electoral
system in which candidate rankings on the ballots are restricted to either approval
or lack thereof. By compromising on the unrestricted domain criterion, approval
voting is able to achieve monotonicity, Pareto, and IIA. Note that the Condorcet
paradox is absent in the setting of approval voting since collective preference, as
defined by comparing the number of approvals for each candidate, is transitive.
When faced with a choice between Pareto and IIA, the more accepted view seems
to support a compromise on IIA. IRV and Borda are both examples of systems
which do not restrict voter’s rankings of candidates in any way and at the same
time achieve Pareto and provide some guarantees comparatively weaker than IIA.
6.1.4 Gibbard–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
Consider a single-winner election with three candidates A, B, and C using the Borda
count. Assume A and B are the only main contenders with a realistic chance of
winning. Consider a voter, Alice, whose preferences are as follows: 1st A, then
B, and C last. If Alice reflects her preferences as they are on the ballot box, i.e.,
she puts A ≻ B ≻ C on the ballot, it is said that she votes sincerely. However,
knowing that the realistic race is only between A and B, it would make sense for
Alice to mark A ≻ C ≻ B on her ballot to give her first preference a better chance
of winning. This would be a case of so-called strategic or tactical voting in which
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considering contextual information the voter misrepresents her preferences on the
ballot to favour a candidate over a relatively less preferred candidate.
It is often argued that an electoral system should ideally ensure that, no matter
the contextual circumstances, the best voting strategy for a voter always is voting
sincerely, i.e., reflecting their actual preferences. However, a significant theoretical
result known as the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem rules out the existence of such
ideal electoral systems altogether under some natural conditions. In the following
we briefly discuss this theorem.
Let us for the moment limit our attention to single-winner systems only. A
basic fairness criterion is to require that every candidate should be able to win. In
the following the definition of this criterion is listed along with that of strategy-
proofness.
• a system is said to have an unrestricted range if its winner can be any candi-
date; and
• a system is said to be strategy-proof (or non-manipulable) if there are circum-
stances under which strategic voting by a voter leads to a winner which is
actually preferred by the voter to a candidate that will win if the voter votes
sincerely.
Mathematically, an unrestricted range is equivalent to the voting function being
surjective or onto. Having an unrestricted range can be seen as a form of the
non-imposition criterion for single-winner systems. Note that neutrality implies an
unrestricted range, so having an unrestricted range can be thought of as a relaxation
of neutrality. Yet Gibbard and Satterthwaite have independently shown that even
under such a relaxed version of neutrality there is no strategy-proof electoral system
other than dictatorship [50, 78].
Theorem 5 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem) There is no unrestricted range
electoral system for an election with more than two candidates that is strategy-proof
and is not dictatorial.
The results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite further demonstrate a one-to-one cor-
respondence between strategy-proof systems and systems satisfying Arrow’s crite-
ria. Duggan and Schwartz have proved a generalized version of the theorem not
restricted to single-winner systems [40].
In light of such impossibility results, and with completely strategy-proof systems
out of the question, electoral systems may be examined based on the specific ma-
nipulation strategies to which they are prone. The choice of a system can then be
made based on the occurring probability and severity of such possible manipulation
strategies in the contextual circumstances of a specific election.
6.1.5 Systems with Respect to Criteria
Table 5 lists selected electoral systems and criteria they do and do not satisfy. A
tick (✓) indicates that the system on that row always satisfies the criterion on that
column, whereas a cross (✗) indicates that the system does not necessarily satisfy
the criterion. The criteria discussed in this chapter and presented in the table are
a selective set of those discussed in social choice theory.
Note that, assuming that voters do not change their minds between multiple
rounds of an election, the TRS and contingent votes can be thought of as the same
system in theory, and hence the two systems have the same properties in Table 5.
The same statement is also true about the exhaustive vote and IRV systems.
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Table 5: Selected electoral system and criteria they satisfy
System Equ. Neu. Maj. Con. Mon. Par. IIA
FPTP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
Approval ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
TRS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Contingent ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Exhaustive ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
IRV ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Borda ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
Cumulative ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
Schulze ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
In some cases, it is easy to see why a system satisfies a specific criterion; e.g., a
candidate that achieves a majority obviously achieves a plurality as well, and hence
FPTP satisfies the majority criterion. In other cases, the reason for a tick or a cross
might be less obvious. We leave the task of justifying the ticks to the reader, but
give some counter-examples to explain some of the crosses in the following. Figure 1
contains the counter-examples we are going to use to this end. Each counter-example
is a profile of an election which specifies the number of voters that have a specific
candidate preference. For instance, the profile indicated as “Election 1” basically
says 4 voters have the preference A ≻ B ≻ C, 2 the preference B ≻ C ≻ A, and 3
the preference C ≻ B ≻ A.
Consider Election 1 in Figure 1. A FPTP election would record 4 votes for A, 2
for B, and 3 for C, and hence the FPTP winner would be A. However, in one-on-one
elections, B would beat both A and C, 5–4 and 6–3, respectively, and hence B is
the Condorcet winner. In fact even C beats A 5–4 in a head-to-head election, which
means FPTP might even elect a Condorcet loser, i.e., a candidate that loses against
all other candidates in head-to-head elections. Also note that if the third group
change their preference from C ≻ B ≻ A to B ≻ C ≻ A, the winner of FPTP will
change to B, despite the fact that the voters who have changed their mind still rank
A the same way with respect to B and C, i.e., they still think C ≻ A and B ≻ A.
Thus FPTP does not satisfy the Condorcet and IIA criteria.
Consider Election 2 in Figure 1 from [67]. With either two-round system (TRS)
or instant run-off voting (IRV), C is eliminated in the first round, and in the second
round between A and B, C’s votes go to A and hence A wins the TRS or IRV
elections. Now consider the case where A is able to gain the support of the last
group of 2 voters and change their preference to A ≻ B ≻ C. In that case, B gets
eliminated in the first round, and in the second round C beats A 9–8. Thus, A loses
the second election despite gaining votes. This shows that TRS and IRV (and hence
the contingent and exhaustive vote systems) are not monotone.
If any of the four systems above, i.e., TRS, IRV, contingent, or exhaustive, is
used to elect the winner in Election 1 in Figure 1, the Condorcet winner B will
be eliminated in the first round and C will be the eventual winner. Hence, these
systems do not necessarily elect the Condorcet winner.
Consider Election 3 in Figure 1 from Condorcet [38]. It is not hard to see that A
is the Condorcet winner but using the standard Borda count, i.e., allocating 2, 1, and
0 points for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd preferences, respectively, elects B as the winner.
In fact, even in a generalized Borda count where pi points are allocated for the i-th
preference, A receives 31p1 + 39p2 + 11p3 points and B 39p1 + 31p2 + 11p3 points.
Since p1 needs to be greater than p2 for the system to make sense, this example
shows that no generalized Borda count can guarantee electing the Condorcet winner.
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Election 1
4 2 3
A B C
B C B
C A A
Election 2
6 5 4 2
A C B B
B A C A
C B A C
Election 3
30 1 29 10 10 1
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Figure 1: Counter-examples of election profiles
Approval voting is a bit trickier in that the outcome of the election not only
depends on voter preferences, but also on the number of candidates each voter
approves. This means, unlike some other systems such as FPTP, TRS, and Borda, in
an approval voting election for each election profile there might be multiple possible
outcomes based on voters’ behaviour. For instance, in Election 1 in Figure 1, if all
voters only approve their top candidate, A would win the election, whereas if all
voters approve their top two candidates, B would win, and at the same time, if the
first and third groups of voters approve one candidate and the second group approves
two, then C would win. A similar situation may happen even if a candidate has a
majority. Thus, approval voting without any restriction on how many candidates
may be approved by voters does not satisfy the majority and Condorcet criteria.
All counter-examples used for FPTP and Borda may be also used for cumulative
voting since both FPTP and Borda can be seen as instances of cumulative voting.
6.2 A Practitioner’s Point of View
In practice, electoral systems are usually broadly categorized as majoritarian, pro-
portional, and mixed systems. Majoritarian systems are based on the general princi-
ple that a single candidate with a plurality of votes is elected to represent and pursue
the demands of a specific (usually geographic) constituency. FPTP, TRS, IRV, and
other similar systems hence fall in this category. Proportional systems on the other
hand, are based on the general principle that the elected body of candidates propor-
tionally reflects the diverse range of views in a heterogeneous society. This category
includes multiple list voting systems and STV, although STV is sometimes referred
to as semi-proportional. Mixed systems aim to attain the best of both worlds by
incorporating elements from the above two types of systems. MMP and two-tier
systems are examples of mixed systems. This categorization is a general guide and
some systems, most notably SNTV, do not seem to fit in any of the categories.
The underlying principles of the majoritarian and proportional systems corre-
spond to two different conceptions of “representation”: principal–agent and micro-
cosm, as put forth by McLean [63]. The principal–agent conception defines rep-
resentation as an agent acting on behalf of a principal, whereas the microcosmic
conception defines representation as statistically typifying the group being repre-
sented. McLean argues that the two conceptions are each entirely reasonable but
inconsistent with each other.
Rae distinguished three main components of an electoral system: district mag-
nitude, electoral formula, and ballot structure [68]. District magnitude refers to
the number of candidates elected in each electoral district; electoral formula is the
algorithm used to calculate the winner(s); and ballot structure refers to the infor-
mation collected from the voter on a ballot. Rae further argues that classification
of electoral systems often deals with only one component, namely the electoral for-
mula, and leaves the other two out, whereas district magnitude and ballot structure
have significant effects on how an electoral system performs. Based on district
magnitude, systems can be classified into single-member and multi-member district
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systems. Different ballot structures on the other hand lead to categorizing systems
based on three aspects: first, the number of votes allowed: either one, more than
one but less than the number of seats or equal to the number of candidates or seats;
second, the type of information the voter is asked to provide: either nominal, ordi-
nal, or cardinal, and third, for whom the voter votes: either for individuals or for
groups of individuals (e.g., parties) [31]. Systems using nominal ballots (i.e., vot-
ing for one option) include FPTP, TRS, and closed-list PR; systems using ordinal
ballots (i.e., ranking the options) include IRV, STV, and Borda count; and systems
using cardinal ballots (i.e., rating the options) include approval and range voting.
Majoritarian systems are praised for their ability to produce a clear tie between
an elected candidate and a constituency, which in turn implies a clear responsibility
and accountability of the elected candidate towards the constituency. Besides, most
majoritarian systems (with, e.g., IRV being an exception) are simple to understand
and do not require complex mathematics to calculate the results, and hence they are
considered to encourage transparency. However, such systems tend to favour large
parties and do not usually produce results that reflect the shares of votes received
by different parties. Thus, minority groups and smaller parties may not be able
to win any seat and are encouraged to integrate into the larger parties. In some
contexts, e.g., when there are two dominant parties, this can be seen as a positive
feature since it produces a clear winner and hence a strong and stable government
as well as a strong opposition and government alternative.
Proportional systems on the other hand emphasize accurately representing the
make-up of diverse electorates. The greater the number of candidates to be elected
from an electoral district, the more proportional the results tend to be. Such systems
should result in governing coalitions that represent a wide range of views in the
political scene, although in some contexts, negotiations to build a coalition may
take a long time. Proportional systems tend to facilitate fragmentation of the party
system. Besides, since multi-member districts are required to guarantee any degree
of proportionality, proportional systems usually lack the clear link between a specific
candidate and the constituency. In contrast with proportionality, the greater the
number of candidates to be elected from an electoral district, the weaker such links
tend to be.
While the principal–agent and microcosmic conceptions describe an elected body’s
collective role in representing the electors, an elected candidate’s individual repre-
sentative role may be defined as that of either a delegate or a trustee. A delegate
in this characterization is expected to listen to and reflect the views of the elec-
tors, whereas a trustee is thought to be entrusted by the electors to use his or her
own judgement and decide on behalf of the electors. Farrell argues that in “party-
based” electoral systems there is a greater tendency for elected representatives to
act as trustees, whereas comparatively in “candidate-based” systems there is more
incentive for elected representatives to act as delegates [44].
Majoritarian systems are considered more susceptible to strategic voting com-
pared to proportional systems. In a FPTP system for example, a voter might vote
for a candidate that they do not prefer but think has a better chance to win. Pro-
portional systems, on the other hand, are considered to encourage voters to declare
their actual preferences.
Majoritarian systems, especially those using single-member districts, are prone
to district boundary irregularities, known asmalapportionment and gerrymandering,
that might arise as a result of the process of district delimitation [44, pp. 202–
205]. Malapportionment refers to the situations in which there are imbalances
between the populations of different electoral districts that favour one party over
others. Gerrymandering refers to the practice of (re)drawing electoral boundaries
in shapes that are expected to disproportionately boost the number of seats won
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by a specific party. Some proportional systems, specially those using smaller multi-
member districts, are susceptible to such irregularities as well. Generally speaking,
the greater the number of candidates to be elected in districts, the less they have the
potential to suffer from malapportionment and gerrymandering [56, Ch. 10]. These
issues however may be resolved by putting a neutral body in charge of district
delimitation.
A widely accepted characterization is that of Duverger who argues that the
single-ballot plurality systems favour party dualism, whereas two-round majority
systems and proportional systems favour multipartism [41]. He further argues that
majoritarian systems may encourage “personality parties”, i.e., those based on a
leader’s popularity, and geographic minority parties, whereas proportional systems
generally encourage “permanent minority parties”, such as ethnic or religious ones,
but discourage “personality parties”. The effects of mixed systems are less under-
stood as these systems only relatively recently have been adopted by a considerable
number of countries.
Proportional systems tend to be more accommodating in adjusting represen-
tation towards historically under-represented groups and minorities. In established
democracies, systems based on multi-member districts have shown a strong increase
in women’s representation, whereas this trend is much weaker in systems based on
single-member districts [61].
Votes that do not count towards the election of any candidate are usually referred
to as wasted votes. Systems such as FPTP tend to leave a larger number of wasted
votes, whereas proportional systems with low thresholds, IRV, and STV aim to
reduce the number of wasted votes. A related issue is vote splitting, and it happens
when similar candidates compete in an election and their potential supporters’ votes
tend to be split between them, which possibly allows a candidate representing a less
popular overall viewpoint to win. FPTP particularly suffers from this issue, whereas
TRS is considered less susceptible, and proportional systems with low thresholds,
IRV, and STV are considered relatively immune to vote splitting.
The two-round system is unique among the discussed systems in that it possibly
requires the electoral administration to run a second election in a short period,
hence significantly increasing the election cost. On the other hand, this unique
property enables voters to change their minds from the first round to the second
and accelerate consensus building between parties to coalesce behind the candidates
in the second round.
Among the multiple highest average (HA) seat allocation methods for list elec-
toral systems, the Danish method is considered to comparatively favour smaller
parties; the Sainte-Laguë method is considered neutral; the modified Sainte-Laguë
and Imperiali methods are considered to favour larger parties; and the d’Hondt
method is considered to favour larger parties the most. Among the largest remain-
der (LR) methods, smaller quotas are more favourable to larger parties. Considering
all proportional systems, it has been shown that they can be generally ordered from
the most to the least favourable to the larger parties as follows [47]: LR using Im-
periali quota, d’Hondt, STV, LR using Droop quota, modified Sainte-Laguë, LR
using Hare quota and Sainte-Laguë, and finally the Danish method.
Mixed systems tend to produce election results that, in terms of proportional-
ity, fall between majoritarian and proportional systems. However, some criticize
such systems for effectively creating two classes of elected candidates with different
mandates and hence undermining the cohesiveness of the elected body of represen-
tatives.
Among the systems that do not fall in the three categories mentioned above,
SNTV is considered to be easy to understand, to accommodate the representation
of minority parties better compared to majoritarian systems, and to fragment the
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party system less compared to proportional systems. However, SNTV tends to result
in many wasted votes, and parties need to consider complex strategic decisions as
to how many candidates to put forth as the system suffers from issues similar to
vote splitting.
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